



THE  
BELGRANO ENQUIRY  
*Handbook & Programme*

Did Britain have to go to War?

HAMPSTEAD TOWN HALL  
7th and 8th November 1986 9.30a.m. to 5p.m.

# Participants

**Welcome** by Cllr Mary Cane, Mayor of Camden

## Assessors

Malcolm Dando, School of Peace Studies, Bradford University—Chairman Professor John Ferguson, President,

The Selly Oak Colleges, 1979-86

## Witnesses

Richard J.S Baker, ex Asst Sec Sheffield Polytechnic former head of dept Sheffield Polytecnic  
Tarn Dalyell M.P..

Clive Ponting

Ian Mikardo M.P.

Malcolm Harper, Director, United Nations Association

Brigadier Michael Harbottle, Director, London Centre for International  
Peace-building

Dr Paul Rogers, Bradford School of Peace Studies Diana Gould, Chair, Belgrano Action

Group Eric Ogden, Falkland Islands Association John Madeley, representing Diego

Garcia Association Ken Coates, The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Dr G.A. Makin,  
Argentinian journalist and others

## Organising Committee

Diana Gould, Chair Duncan Smith, Co-ordinator Nick

Kollerstrom, Secretary Ted Haywood, Treasurer

## Reader

Joao de Sousa

# Introduction

The Falklands War was a traumatic event in Britain's post-war history and the courage and skill of the Armed Forces evoked a great popular response. It is, however, becoming increasingly clear that General Galtieri's invasion was so flagrant and foolish an affront to international order that he could almost certainly have been evicted, without bloodshed, through the United Nations or by some alternative means, had the British Government seriously wished to do so. **If so, it is urgent to look back and enquire why 1,000 lives and billions of pounds were sacrificed without achieving any settlement.** As things stand, the Falklands are like an aching tooth. The way of life of the islanders has been disrupted, Britain has already spent huge sums of money which she cannot afford and the fragile democracy of Argentina has to maintain armed forces which it would like to reduce further in order to tackle the horrific economic problems left behind by the Generals.

In Britain's secretive society it is not easy to find out the truth about the Falklands tragedy. The Government has every incentive to keep the facts hidden and has been careful to avoid any debate about the Report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The format of this Report is so confused that the press failed to publicise the fact that it contains a searching and carefully argued Minority Report which is 51 pages in length. Even more remarkable is that this contains a list of 30 questions, mostly of fundamental importance, which the Tory majority on the Committee refused to put to the Government. (See Appendix.) A cloud of mystery therefore surrounds many aspects of the events of April/May 1982. Some, such as the missing log book of the *Conqueror* and the circumstances surrounding the death of Hilda Murrell seem sinister, and there are powerful forces at work to hide the truth about other aspects which the Government hopes they have safely whitewashed.

Gradually, however, enough facts have emerged to form the outline of a picture which the British public ought to see and the Belgrano Enquiry hopes to clarify the facts and draw the threads together. Facts and opinions will be presented for cross examination by people with varying viewpoints and, subject to the need to keep to a timetable, the public attending the enquiry will be encouraged to ask questions. Finally the assessors, all of whom are experienced in weighing evidence, will publish a report of their conclusions.

The remainder of the handbook outlines the main topics which will be dealt with by the Enquiry. Its terms of reference are 'to examine and report on the events relating to the Falkland Islands which occurred in April and May 1982, their causes and effects and the impact they have had on attempts to resolve the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Islands and on the security of the South Atlantic'. The programme will, therefore, try to present the events as they unfolded in these two crucial months as vividly as possible. It will also show the links between this initial cover-up and the 'patterns of deceit' in connection with Westland and the April raid on Libya. Even in other matters, such as unemployment, the Government is trying to hide the truth. All this shows the vital necessity for open government and accountability to Parliament.

One of the main objects of the Enquiry is therefore to suggest the steps which should be taken to prise out the truth about the Falklands war and its vital connection with other threats to peace in Libya, Nicaragua and the Middle East.

The Enquiry will sit for six hours a day on 7th and 8th November on each of which there will be four sessions of 1½ hours. Each session will start with a brief prologue which sets the scene and presents basic factual data in an objective manner. The notes which follow include the prologues, the subjects which will be dealt with in each session and the names of the main witnesses.

# Session I

## The Background

Friday, 9.30- 11.00 a.m.

*Witnesses'* Malcolm Harper and Michael Harbottle

### PROLOGUE

In a world bristling with nuclear weapons it is more vital than at any time in history to resolve differences without resorting to armed conflict. The continuing dispute between Britain and Argentina is a classic example of a quarrel which, in a sane world, should have been capable of a peaceful solution. It is one which has lasted for 150 years and has never been submitted to independent arbitration. Both sides sincerely believe that they are right and the issues at stake are not of vital strategic importance.

This Enquiry is directly concerned with events which took place early in 1982, but in order to judge attitudes and actions it is necessary to look briefly backward. Possession, it is said, is nine-tenths of the law and it was natural that Britain should drag her feet during the sporadic talks over the Falklands which took place with Argentina over many years— both bilaterally and under the auspices of the United Nations. Equally naturally Argentina became increasingly impatient and there were signs that forceful measures might be contemplated. Faced with this situation the British record in recent years has been a painful one. There were occasional acts of decision but the House of Commons must shoulder heavy blame for the failure of the Ridley mission and in the months before the Argentine invasion there was a catalogue of negative and misleading signals. All the indications were that Britain cared little about the Falklands and hence the gamblers in Buenos Aires grew bolder. There were no preparations for war in Britain and Mrs Thatcher's request for contingency plans on 3 March 1982 does not seem to have prompted action. Attention was seemingly confined to the wrangle about funds between the Army and the Navy. The indolence and indecision which marked British policy during the months leading up to the invasion is vividly described by Clive Ponting in *Whitehall: Tragedy and Farce* (Hamish Hamilton, pp. 160-166) and by Gavshon and Rice in *The Sinking of the Belgrano* (NEL Books, first two chapters).

Thus a situation which had long been simmering suddenly boiled over when an irresponsible dictator occupied the Islands on 2 April 1982. **This was a grossly provocative act but how, in such a case, should a mature and democratic power react? Should it, in cowboy fashion, pull out its gun or should it call upon the international community to play an active part in forcing withdrawal by the aggressor?** From the standpoint of peace, a negotiated settlement through the United Nations would have made an invaluable contribution to world security-There is an old adage that if you want peace you must prepare for war, but in a nuclear age it is truer to say that if you want peace you must prepare for peace. Owing to a lack of contingency planning for peace the United Nations has constantly been forced to be a fireman rather than a fire preventer. The Falklands dispute provided a unique opportunity for putting into practice a strategy for co-operative peace keeping. When the invasion occurred Britain did indeed appeal to the Security Council and secured the adoption of Resolution 502 which stated that the Council was 'deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April by armed forces of Argentina and determining that there exists a breach of the peace

1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from **the** Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and
3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom **to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences** and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations'. Alas, this favourable resolution was not followed up by any efforts by the British Government to secure U.N. help in getting it obeyed. *Malcolm Harper*, Director of the United Nations Association will therefore discuss what might have been done and describe some of the options open to the Security Council and the Secretary General had Britain offered active co-operation. After him Brigadier *Michael Harbottle*, Director of the London Centre for International Peacebuilding, who has served with U.N. peacekeeping contingents, will describe past experience of international peacekeeping and future possibilities. These two witnesses will then be questioned and after discussions they will wind up the session.

## Session II

# The Slide Into War

Friday, 11.15-12.45p.m. *Witness:* Tarn Dalyell M.P.

### PROLOGUE

Though Britain may have presented a monolithic front to the outside world, there were, in fact, deep divisions of opinion about how to respond to Galtieri's aggression both within the Government and within the Opposition parties. One of the important aims of the Enquiry is to clarify the situation so that if acts of aggression should occur in the future all concerned may be better prepared and not rushed off their feet by a tide of emotion, misapprehension and precipitate action.

Tarn Dalyell, who was not called to speak at the crucial emergency debate on Saturday, 3rd April will describe: -The reaction of leading politicians to the crisis. The mobilisation of the Task Force and its terms of reference. The involvement of Gen. Alexander Haig as 'mediator'. The invidious position of Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary.

He will demand answers to the questions:—

Why during April was the U.N. virtually ignored? Why did Pym go to Washington and New York on 1st May? Was he in touch with the Prime Minister on 2nd May before the sinking of the *Belgrano*? If not, why not?

## Session III

# Crisis Management and the Control of Risks in a Nuclear Age

Friday, 1.45—3.15 p.m.

*Witnesses'*. Clive Ponting and Ken Coates

### PROLOGUE

The Falklands operation was a complex military task launched at very short notice. The war was conducted at 8,000 miles distance and with only one base—Ascension Island—to provide any support. Communications were difficult and only possible through the use of United States satellites. The United States also provided important logistic support particularly at the Ascension base. Much of the support for the task force and the operations of the force had to be improvised as the campaign developed. There was no clear plan consistently implemented from the beginning.

The operation was commanded from Fleet HQ at Northwood in a deliberate attempt by the military to stop direct control by the politicians. Political control was exercised by the War Cabinet (OD (SA)) which usually met once a day in the morning. The only military representative on the committee was Admiral Lewin as Chief of Defence Staff. This caused considerable friction within the Ministry of Defence where the Royal Navy felt that the whole operation should be under their control as the main contributor to the Task Force. The other services, particularly the Royal Air Force, resented the role of the RN which they felt gave them too much prominence and would be likely to lead to more money being spent on the RN after the war.

The role of the War Cabinet was to balance diplomatic and military action and ensure that the two worked together. **In practice without a coherent strategy they veered from one to the other depending on who had last had the ear of the Committee or the Prime Minister.**

Some of the major questions that emerge are:—

What was the flow of information from the military to the politicians?

Did the military pass on information that might not back up their own idea of how the campaign should be fought?

Did the politicians have a coherent strategy for controlling the conflict?

With bad communications from the Falklands and from Northwood were politicians taking decisions on out-of-date and inaccurate information?

What lessons does all of this have for the flow of information and the control of major conflicts including the possibility of the release of nuclear weapons?

# Session IV

## Was It Illegal to Sink the Belgrano?

Friday, 3.30-5.00p.m. *Witness:* Diana Gould and Clive Ponting

### PROLOGUE

Did the Prime Minister cause the Royal Navy to break International Law when she authorised the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, *General Belgrano* on 2nd May 1982?

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states:-'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain international peace and security.'

**The Government claims (White Paper, November 1985) that a vague 'threat to a mission' justified the sinking of the *Belgrano* under the terms of Article 51. Is there any legal basis for this assertion?**

If steps are not taken to condemn the sinking as illegal under International Law, will a precedent be set which could threaten future world peace? In fact did not this allow Mrs Thatcher to claim that the United States strike on Libya 14/15 April 1986, using British bases, was legal under Article 51?

The subsequent misleading statements appear to be an attempt to hide from the world the fact that the *Belgrano* was not-an immediate threat.

### Facts

1. The cruiser *General Belgrano* was commissioned in 1938 in the United States; was due to be taken out of active service to become a floating museum in 1982; had 1,042 men on board; and had 15 six-inch guns whose range was 13 miles.
2. The *Belgrano* was outside the southern edge of the 200 nautical mile Total Exclusion Zone and had been steaming steadily westwards for 11 hours at speeds varying between 11 and 14 knots when she was sunk at 18.58 G.M.T. on Sunday, 2 May 1982.
3. The *Belgrano* had been shadowed by the submarine, H.M.S. *Conqueror* for 30 hours. The sighting was first reported to Northwood at 14.00 G.M.T. on Saturday, 1 May 1982. Admiral Lord Lewin was not informed until the morning of 2nd May.
4. At the time of the sinking, the Task Force was over 300 miles away to the N.E. of the Falklands, steaming in a north westerly direction. The *Glamorgan*, *Arrow* and *Alacrity* had been shelling Port Stanley and were North of the port, over 200 miles away.
5. 368 Argentinians died in the *Belgrano*.
6. No British lives had been lost prior to the sinking. *Fiction*
  1. '...Sunday, 2 May at 8p.m. London time, one of our submarines detected the Argentine cruiser, *General Belgrano* ...' - Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, Parliament, 4 May 1982.
  2. 'The *General Belgrano* made many changes of course throughout the day.'-Peter Blaker, Minister of State for Defence, The Prime Minister, etc., 1982.
  3. The *Belgrano* was: 'closing on elements of our Task Force.'— Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, Parliament, 4 May 1982.
    - 'heading towards our Task Force.'-Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Lewin, January 1983.
    - 'six hours away with exocets.'-Prime Minister, T.V. Election News Conference, June 1983.
  4. 'Concerned that H.M.S. *Conqueror* might lose the *General Belgrano* as she ran over the shallow water of the Burdwood Bank.'—Vice Admiral Sir John Woodward, Task Force Commander, 1982.
  5. The Argentine aircraft carrier *25 de Mayo* had been lost by one of our submarines.—Rumours, 1983 onwards.
  6. The *Conqueror's* logs were removed by a crew member.—November 1984 onwards.
  7. Three ships came sailing in!—Rumours 1982 onwards; Michael Mates, Parliament, 18 February; Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Lewin; World in Action, June 1985.

An examination of the legal situation will be made using the evidence provided in the Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee which was published in July 1985, and the way in which the crucial decision to sink the *Belgrano* was taken at lunchtime on 2nd May in the absence of the Foreign Secretary will be highlighted.

# Session V

## The Political Costs of Sinking the *Belgrano*?

Saturday, 9.30-11.00a.m.

*Witness:* Paul Rogers

### PROLOGUE

With the ending of the US mediation effort on 30 April, the work of effecting a cease-fire passed to Peru and the United Nations. The intense efforts reached a climax on 2 May and the major escalation in military action occasioned by the *Belgrano* sinking radically altered the stance of the Argentinian junta, hardening them against accepting a compromise.

Opinion throughout Latin America also hardened against Britain and there developed substantial political support for Argentina accompanied, in some cases, by military supplies. Prior to the war, Argentina had

been generally unpopular within Latin America, not least because of the notorious human rights record of the regime. The escalation of the war by Britain made it politically necessary for other Latin American countries to alter their stance and offer support.

In Western Europe, the attitude throughout April had been one of bemused surprise—astonishment that a post-imperial country such as Britain could engage in the massive military action which the Task Force involved, but support for the British case against the illegal Argentinian invasion. This changed to astonishment and a degree of horror as the military engagement escalated with the sinking of the *Belgrano* and led to a marked loss of support for Britain in many countries.

**The majority of E.E.C. countries and the Commonwealth were in favour of a negotiated settlement and were willing to give strong diplomatic and economic support.** As it became obvious that Britain was determined on a solely military solution, so support for Britain's political stance diminished. There was particular concern that rapid military escalation was an extremely bad example for other crises; in particular, the dubious basis of the attack on the *Belgrano* in terms of international law as discussed in Session IV. How was 'self-defence' to be defined in the future? Within a few weeks of the *Belgrano* incident, this was graphically illustrated by the Israeli attack on Lebanon, when the Israeli government used the British action in the Falklands as justification for their massive use of force in extending what was stated to be a 'sanitisation' of a border area into a full-scale invasion. Further events in Libya, Nicaragua and elsewhere underline the imperative need to clarify the law and to enable the United Nations to promote collective peace keeping.

In the light of this background Paul Rogers will discuss various questions which affected Britain's standing in the world including: -

Why did the peace mission of General Alexander Haig fail?

Did he try to work through the United Nations?

What made Peru initiate its Peace Plan? What was proposed?

How much did (a) Haig and (b) Mrs Thatcher know about the Peruvian plan?

If the Argentine Junta had agreed the plan, should it have been accepted by Britain?

# Session VI

## Cost of the War

Saturday, 11.15-12.45 pm

*Witnesses:* Financial-Paul Rogers  
Human Cost-Diana Gould

### PROLOGUE

The full costs of the war in financial terms will never be known. Government estimates were around £700 million, but even the most limited knowledge of the extraordinary size of the forces assembled, the lucrative contracts for emergency conversion of merchant shipping, the massive expenditure on munitions and the maintenance of the forces **for** many months in the South Atlantic, all indicate a much higher figure, carefully concealed in other forms of expenditure.

The financial costs of Fortress Falklands are well documented **in** terms of official statistics and are given below:

1982-3	£800m.
1983-4	£624m.
1984-5	£684m.
1985-6	£552m. Estimated costs until the end of the present parliament:
1986-7	£450m.
1987-8	£300m. <b>Over</b> a six-year period, the total cost will have been about

*£3,400m., approximately £2m. per islander*, but these costs do not include recurrent expenditure on, for example, salaries of military personnel, on the spurious grounds that we would be paying these wherever the people were. As it is manifestly obvious that troops in the Falklands are not contributing to UK home defence, the full costs should be included if a true indication of the economic consequences of the war are to be appreciated. **On this basis, a Sunday Times estimate puts the cost of Fortress Falklands at well in excess of £5,000m. over the six years.** *Human costs* During the course of the Falklands War 255 British servicemen and civilians were killed and 777 wounded, some maimed for life. Because of the often inclement and hostile environment accidents have occurred in the last four years in which airmen and helicopter crewmen, sailors and soldiers have been killed and injured and **such cost in lives will continue** until there is a permanent political settlement between Britain and Argentina. The difficulties experienced by the families of those **who** died or were injured have been well chronicled in Jean Carr's book *Another Story: Women and the Falklands War*, published by Hamish Hamilton.

The Argentinians lost 652 men dead and missing and a great many were wounded. Their misery has been compounded by the efforts on the part of the authorities to keep them hidden so that the true human cost of the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas is not made apparent.

The relations of the Argentine dead are still not able to visit the graves of their loved ones. Various organisations such as the International Red Cross, the South Atlantic Council and Rotary International are striving to alter this.

One of the members of the Belgrano Action Group, the mother of a young sailor killed in the *Coventry* was among the group of British bereaved who visited the Argentine cemetery whilst in the Falklands in April. She was shocked to find so few graves with actual names and so many with 'Argentine soldier known only to God', and said a prayer for them and those who mourned them.

She has since responded to a request to write something to comfort the bereaved families and has told them of the peaceful location and the well tended graves. To use her own words she 'felt no animosity towards the ordinary Argentinians'. Like us however she wants to know the answer to the question 'Did Britain have to go to war?' A British sailor who served in the War will also testify.

*INTERLUDE 12.45 Prayers and two minutes silence*

# Session VII

## Lessons of the War for the Future

Saturday, 1.45 - 3.15p.m.

*Witnesses:* Ian Mikardo M.P Michael Harbottle Eric Ogden Malcolm Harper John Madeley

### PROLOGUE

**Much evidence now suggests that the Falklands War was an unnecessary, hazardous, unrealistic and outrageously expensive gamble.** Moreover, **since** hundreds of men died gallantly a settlement will now be harder to obtain than if the War had been avoided. Finally, the current situation cannot last. The tiny island community in the Falklands can never be self supporting and to ferry men and supplies 8,000 miles between Britain and the South Atlantic is a ludicrous waste of resources. Historically, the Falklands have relied on Argentina for all kinds of services, from schools to hospitals and, even during the War, the large British community permanently domiciled in that country continued to thrive without interference. It should surely be possible to establish a peaceful relationship between the Falkland Islands and Argentina which would be beneficial to both.

Surveys show that public opinion now demands a settlement and at the last General Assembly of the United Nations the following Resolution was passed overwhelmingly. The UK and Argentina are called upon to initiate negotiations to find the means to resolve peacefully and definitively the problems pending between both countries including all aspects of the Falklands.' The only countries which voted against the Resolution were the United Kingdom, Oman, Belize and the Solomon Islands!

Many different ways of obtaining a settlement have been suggested and will be discussed by the witnesses.

Options include:—

Submitting the claims to sovereignty made by the UK and Argentina

to the International Court of Justice;

Establishing a United Nations Trusteeship in the Falklands;

Making the Islands United Nations territory;

A transfer of sovereignty to Argentina but a leaseback to Britain;

Shared sovereignty of the kind which has kept Andorra autonomous for 500 years.

Most of these options seem reasonable but after their traumatic experience during the War the islanders naturally have strong views about the future and *Eric Ogden*, Director of the Falkland Islands Association will explain their reservations. The British voter, however, may feel that in view of the need for economy and security in the South Atlantic 1,800 people cannot veto a settlement for ever.

It should also be noted that governments in London have not always been so scrupulous in safeguarding the interests of islanders living in British colonies. Lord Fenner Brockway has referred to 'the criminal policy of the British Government in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, exiling the whole population, leaving them first in such dire poverty that the women had to become prostitutes to keep their families alive-doing that in order that the Island might become an American nuclear base.' At the enquiry a representative of the Diego Garcia Association will describe the current plight of the survivors of the thousands of people who inhabited the Island in 1966.

In this Session witnesses connected with the United Nations, the Opposition parties and the islanders will discuss how the South Atlantic can be made secure and free from nuclear weapons and how the Falklands can establish a fruitful relationship both with the mainland and with Britain. Can the United Nations, which was pushed aside during the War, play a valuable part in finding such a solution?

**On the wider political front it will be interesting to see whether future historians will equate Suez and the Falklands as final spasms of imperial bellicosity.** The bravery and efficiency of the Armed Forces, operating under great difficulties, gave glamour and short-term political advantage to the War. **Time is likely to underline its political failure both nationally and internationally.** There are many practical issues which witnesses will wish to discuss, such as:-

How can the Cabinet be made more responsible to Parliament?

Can the Opposition equip itself to deal more adequately with sudden emergencies?

Can the Security Council of the United Nations devise a system of contingency planning for the peaceful settlement of disputes? How can we ensure that nuclear weapons are never used?

# Session VIII

## Conclusions

Saturday, 3.30-5 p.m.

*Witnesses:* Ian Mikardo M.P.      Clive Ponting  
Paul Rogers                      Malcolm Harper  
Diana Gould                      Michael Harbottle  
Dr G.A. Makin

### PROLOGUE

The purpose of this Enquiry has been to assemble the most important facts about the Falklands War that are publicly known, to put them in perspective and to pinpoint those areas in which, in the interests of world peace and of the British public, it is vital to know more. It used to be an axiom that in this country Ministers are responsible to Parliament but the Thatcher Government, though now only supported by a small minority of the electorate, has continued not only to evade discussion of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report in Parliament but also to answer 30 key questions posed by the Opposition (see Appendix). **A cover-up on this scale is unprecedented and witnesses will discuss how enough facts can be unearthed to enable the conduct of the Prime Minister and of the War Cabinet to be judged and how both international and British law can be clarified.**

There can be little hope that the present Government will reveal any more facts except under extreme pressure. They believe in secrecy and the use of the infamous Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act. Only a surprise verdict of a jury saved Clive Ponting from gaol and there has been a huge increase in the money spent on the security services. The Opposition must, therefore, challenge the Government about a whole complex of issues discussed at this Enquiry and the Assessors will be invited to report on such questions as the following:—

To what extent do the facts presented at the Enquiry strengthen the case for a Freedom of Information Act of the kind advocated by the Opposition parties?

Should Select Committees be authorised to compel Ministers and Civil Servants to give evidence on oath at the request of a Committee as a whole or at the unanimous request of the Opposition Members?

In view of the failure of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to elicit the truth about the Falklands War should an Inquiry under the terms of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1922 be appointed to secure the facts behind the unanswered questions listed in the Appendix overleaf?

In the light of the facts now published do the Assessors consider that the sinking of the *Belgrano* was a breach of International Law?

Did the interpretation of 'self-defence' (in the context of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter) which was used by Mrs Thatcher to justify the sinking provide a precedent which was used by President Reagan in defending the raid on Libya? Should the International Court of Justice, at the request of the United Nations, provide a definition of 'self-defence' which all nations should be urged to accept? Should the United Nations take steps to support the ruling of the

International Court in the recent case of Nicaragua? What steps should be taken to implement the Resolution of the

General Assembly of the U.N. referred to in the previous Session? Opinions on these issues by the Assessors, which will be published as soon as possible, should help to increase public concern and to encourage a demand to find out the truth. It might also be valuable for the Peace Movement and the Churches to spend more time and effort in seeking ways to strengthen the United Nations which can only be as effective as Governments allow it to be. Britain, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council could play a crucial role in developing methods of peace keeping if it were represented by a Government pledged to promote an international rule of law. Finally, since peace is fundamental, the Opposition parties may wish to step up their campaign to expose past errors and to ensure that Britain will, in future, opt for peace with justice rather than for war.

# Appendix

*House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs* List of Questions posed in the Minority Report on pp. cxvu-viii of the Third Report-1984-85

1. Why was no notice taken of the warnings from both the Joint Intelligence Committee and Lord Carrington about the possibility of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands?
2. Why did Sir John Nott fail to respond to Lord Carrington's repeated warnings about the likely consequences of the withdrawal of *Endurance*?
3. Why was the Prime Minister's instruction (minuted on Ambassador Williams' report of 3 March 1982) to make contingency plans not carried out?
4. What considerations prevented the despatch of a naval force to the South Atlantic in early March 1982?
5. Were any relevant and significant state documents withheld from the Franks Committee?
6. After Mr Pym's statement in the House on 21 April 1982, what influences were brought to bear on him, and why, to induce him to return to the House and amend his statement?
7. Why did it take 11 days to deposit in the Library of the House a copy of the 23 April warning? What steps were taken to publicise its terms, other than those mentioned in this Report?
8. What communications passed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Embassies in Washington and Lima during April and May 1982?
9. In addition to official communications what information, if any, about the Peruvian Peace initiative did the Prime Minister or other Ministers receive from other sources, including the United States Embassy in Lima, or sources in Britain or elsewhere?
10. What were the considerations which led to the decisions to escalate military activity in the South Atlantic on 1 May 1982, and when were they taken?
11. What range of military opinion did the War Cabinet consult when considering military policy for the period after the arrival of the Task Force in the latitude of the Falklands but before the amphibious force could arrive some two weeks later?
12. What information can be obtained from the Government of Peru about the conduct of the Peruvian peace proposals and about the information on them passed by the then Peruvian Government, officially or unofficially, to H.M. Government?
13. Did H.M. Government ignore the report from the British Ambassador in Lima of his conversation with the Peruvian Foreign Secretary on 30 April 1982? If so, why? If it was not ignored, what action was taken and to whom was the information sent?
14. Why was no consideration given, at the meeting of the War Cabinet on 30 April, to the significance of the United States declaration of support for the U.K., and particularly to its economic and political impact on the Junta and on the political balance of power within ruling circles in Argentina?
15. What advice did the War Cabinet receive concerning the scope of military action possible within the terms of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and Resolution 502 of the Security Council?
16. What consideration was given to the ideas contained in the Pym Memorandum of 1 May at the War Cabinet meetings of 30 April and 2 May 1982? Why were Mr Pym's proposals rejected?
17. Why was the Foreign Secretary on mission in Washington, not consulted about the changes in the Rules of Engagement made on 2 May 1982 to permit the sinking of the *Belgrano* and other Argentine warships outside the territorial waters?
18. Was Mr Pym right in declaring that President Belaunde's proposals were 'only outlines', or was Secretary Haig right in believing that they were firm enough to form the basis of an agreement?
19. Why did the Government ignore or defy the United Nations Resolution 502 which it had itself drafted?
20. Why was there no meeting of the Mandarins Committee before the War Cabinet deliberations of 2 May?
21. Was the decision to sink the *Belgrano* not taken by the War Cabinet but by an impromptu and unminuted gathering assembled by the Prime Minister or Lord Lewin? Who was present at the respective meetings? At which meeting was the decision formally made and minuted?
22. When was the likelihood of a specific initiative from the Secretary-General of the United Nations known to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet? When was it known that the Secretary-General and Mr Pym would be meeting on the evening of 2 May?
23. Did Admiral Lord Lewin, before going to Chequers on 2 May, consult the Chiefs of Staff and senior naval officers on changing the Rules of Engagement and if so (a) what was their advice, and (b) why were these consultations not revealed?
24. What intercepts were made, and when, of orders to the Argentine fleet; which of them were decoded, and when; which of the decrypts were passed to Northwood and when; and which were then passed to the War Cabinet, and when? Were the 'Guardian' and 'Observer' reports on this matter (see para. 6.11 above) correct?

25. What are the answers to the questions which we proposed the Committee should ask and which the Committee decided not to ask?
26. What minutes or instructions, other than the Legge minute and the Baker minute, were passed in the Department of Defence or other Departments designed to suppress or falsify information which should have been given to Parliament?
27. How far was national security used to justify the suppression of information which had no security implications?
28. How could it have been impracticable to translate the Rules of Engagement into lay language for the Committee when that had already been done for the War Cabinet?
29. What are the answers to the four questions in para. 6.8 above?
30. What other untrue or misleading statements were made by Ministers to Parliament in addition to those set out in paras. 7.6—7.16 above?